The English Court’s Service-Out Jurisdiction in International Tortious Disputes by Arzandeh, Ardavan
                          Arzandeh, A. (2017). The English Court’s Service-Out Jurisdiction in
International Tortious Disputes. Law Quarterly Review, 133, 144-160.
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication record in Explore Bristol Research
PDF-document
This is the author accepted manuscript (AAM). The final published version (version of record) is available online
via Sweet & Maxwell or through the Westlaw portal. Please refer to any applicable terms of use of the publisher.
University of Bristol - Explore Bristol Research
General rights
This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite only the published
version using the reference above. Full terms of use are available:
http://www.bristol.ac.uk/pure/about/ebr-terms
1 
 
THE ENGLISH COURT’S SERVICE-OUT JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL 
TORTIOUS DISPUTES 
 
Ardavan Arzandeh 
University of Bristol Law School 
I. Introduction 
The English court’s power, in a cross-border commercial dispute, to grant an order for the 
service of proceedings on a defendant outside of its territory is a well-established part of its 
national rules of jurisdiction. First introduced under the Common Law Procedure Act 1852, 
this jurisdiction is presently codified within Part 6 of the Civil Procedure Rules (‘C.P.R.’).1 
C.P.R., r. 6.36 confirms the claimant’s right to seek permission to serve proceedings on a 
foreign-based defendant, in those cases which either fall entirely outside the material scope of 
the Brussels Regime2 or those which are covered by Article 6(1) of the Brussels Ia 
Regulation3 and Article 4(1) of the Lugano II Convention.4 
Unlike the other two bases for adjudicatory competence within the English national 
rules – namely, the defendant’s submission to the English proceedings and the defendant’s 
presence in England at the time the claim form is served – the power to serve proceedings out 
of the jurisdiction is discretionary in nature.5 The relevant considerations for the application 
of this discretionary jurisdiction are spelt out in the House of Lords’ decision in Seaconsar 
Far East Ltd v Bank Markazi Jomhouri Islami Iran.6 According to this ruling, a claimant, 
seeking to serve a claim form on a foreign-based defendant, has to establish that: (a) there is a 
“serious issue to be tried” in the case; (b) the claim falls within the confines of one of the 
jurisdictional “gateways” currently listed within C.P.R. P.D. 6B para. 3.1; and, (c) England is 
forum conveniens – i.e., the proper forum in which the proceedings should be entertained. 
This article is broadly concerned with the English court’s service-out jurisdiction in 
international tortious disputes. In this context, C.P.R. P.D. 6B para. 3.1(9) outlines the 
relevant jurisdictional gateways. Based on this provision 
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1 From 1883 until 1999, these rules had been set out under Order 11 of the Rules of the Supreme Court. 
2 Brussels Regime covers provisions within the Regulation (E.U.) No. 1215/2012 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in 
civil and commercial matters (recast) [2012] O.J. L. 351/1 (hereafter, “Brussels Ia Regulation”) and the 
Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters 
[2007] O.J. L. 339/3 (hereafter, the “Lugano II Convention”). 
3 Under Article 6(1) “if the defendant is not domiciled in a Member State, the jurisdiction of the courts of each 
Member State shall, subject to Article 18(1), Article 21(2) and Articles 24 and 25 [of the Brussels Ia 
Regulation], be determined by the law of that Member State”. 
4 According to Article 4(1) “If the defendant is not domiciled in a State bound by this Convention, the 
jurisdiction of the courts of each State bound by this Convention shall, subject to the provisions of Articles 22 
and 23 [of the Lugano II Convention], be determined by the law of that State”. 
5 Lord Collins of Mapesbury, et al, Dicey, Morris & Collins on the Conflict of Laws, 15th edn., (London: Sweet 
& Maxwell, 2012), Rule 34, at para. 11.141. 
6 [1994] A.C. 438. More recently, these requirements were reiterated in Lord Collins of Mapesbury’s judgment 
in Altimo Holdings and Investment Ltd v Kyrgyz Mobil Tel Ltd [2011] UKPC 7; [2012] 1 W.L.R. 1804 at [71], 
[81] and [88]. 
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“the claimant may serve a claim form out of the jurisdiction with the permission of the court 
under rule 6.36 where (a) damage was sustained, or will be sustained, within the 
jurisdiction; or (b) damage which has been or will be sustained results from an act 
committed, or likely to be committed, within the jurisdiction.” 
The discussion which follows focuses specifically on the meaning of “damage” for the 
purpose of gateway 9(a). This provision was first introduced into (what is now) the C.P.R. in 
1987.7 Its creation has been widely considered, amongst legal academics,8 as aligning the tort 
gateways within the C.P.R. with the special jurisdiction rule in matters relating to tort, delict 
or quasi-delict under (what is now) Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ia Regulation, as interpreted 
by the Court of Justice (‘CJEU’) in Handelswekerij GJ Bier BV v Mines de Potasse d’Alsace 
SA.9 Indeed, the English court has traditionally relied on the CJEU’s jurisprudence,10 in 
interpreting gateway 9(a), and construed the provision as covering only those instances where 
damage that was directly felt by the immediate victim of the wrongful act had been sustained 
in England.11 More recently, though, another body of English authorities has emerged which 
points to a different interpretive approach.12 In these cases, C.P.R. P.D. 6B para. 3.1(9)(a) has 
been ascribed a much wider scope and is said to include indirect (as well as direct) damages 
suffered by the victim (or their family members) in England. 
In short, there is confusion surrounding the precise meaning of damage under gateway 
9(a). This article seeks to address this uncertainty. The discussion which follows is presented 
in three main parts. Part II outlines an account of the English court’s traditional approach to 
the interpretation of the provision. Part III, then, analyses the emergence of a stream of 
precedent which evidences a divergence from the traditional position. Finally, Part IV seeks 
to address the apparent confusion in the law by identifying and advancing a reasoned case in 
support of the most plausible interpretation for gateway 9(a). In this respect, it is argued that 
the English court should unequivocally revert to its traditional interpretation and read C.P.R. 
                                                          
7 At the time of its creation, Order 11(1)(f) of the Rules of the Supreme Court was the relevant provision. 
8 E.g. P.M. North and J.J. Fawcett, Cheshire & North’s Private International Law, 11th edn., (London: 
Butterworths, 1987), at p. 202 and L. Collins, et al, Dicey and Morris on The Conflict of Laws, 11th edn., 
(London: Stevens & Sons Ltd, 1987), Rule 28(6), at p. 328. More recently, see Lord Collins of Mapesbury, et 
al, Dicey, Morris & Collins on the Conflict of Laws, 15th edn., (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2012), at para. 
11.214. 
9 [1976] (Case 21/76) E.C.R. 1735. Strictly speaking, the Bier case concerned the interpretation of Article 5(3) 
of the Brussels Convention of 27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil 
and Commercial Matters. However, there is virtually no difference between Article 5(3) of that instrument and 
the equivalent rules under Article 5(3) of the Brussels I and Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ia Regulations. Hence, 
there is no reason why the Court of Justice case law on the interpretation of Article 5(3) of the Convention and 
Brussels I should not apply to the construction of Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ia Regulation. 
10 E.g. Dumez France SA v Hessische Landesbank Case [1990] (Case 220/88) E.C.R. I-49; Marinari v Lloyds 
Bank Plc [1995] (Case C-364/93) E.C.R. I-2719; Réunion Européenne SA v Spliethoff’s Bevrachtingskantoor 
BV [1998] (C-51/97) E.C.R. I-6511; and, Zuid-Chemie BV v Philippo’s Mineralenfabriek NV/SA [2009] (Case 
C-189/8) E.C.R. I-6917. 
11 E.g. Metall und Rohstoff v Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette [1990] 1 Q.B. 391; Bastone & Firminger Ltd v 
Nasima Enterprises (Nigeria) Ltd [1996] C.L.C. 1902; Beecham Group plc v Norton Healthcare Ltd [1997] 
F.S.R. 81; ABCI v BFT [2003] EWCA Civ 205; [2003] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 146; Newsat Holdings Ltd v Zani [2006] 
EWHC 342 (Comm); [2006] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 707; Erste Group Bank AG (London) v JSC (VMZ Red October) 
[2015] EWCA Civ 379; and, Brownlie v Four Seasons Holdings Inc [2015] EWCA Civ 665; [2015] C.P. Rep. 
40. 
12 E.g. Booth v Phillips [2004] EWHC 1437 (Comm); [2004] 1 W.L.R. 3292; Cooley v Ramsey [2008] EWHC 
129 (QB); [2008] I.L.Pr. 27; Saldanha v Fulton Navigation Inc [2011] EWHC 1118 (Admlty); [2011] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 206; Wink v Croatia Osiguranje DD [2013] EWHC 1118 (QB); Stylianou v Toyoshima [2013] EWHC 
2188 (QB); and Pike v Indian Hotels Co Ltd [2013] EWHC 4096 (QB). 
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P.D. 6B para. 3.1(9)(a) consistently with the construction of Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ia 
Regulation. 
II. The Traditional Approach 
C.P.R. P.D. 6B para. 3.1(9)(a) is a relatively new jurisdictional gateway. Prior to its 
introduction in 1987, a plaintiff, who sought to commence cross-border tort proceedings in 
England against a foreign-based defendant, had to establish that the claim had been “founded 
on a tort committed within the jurisdiction”. Consequently, the place where the damage was 
sustained was of no relevance in the court’s decision whether to allow the tort proceedings to 
be served outside England.13 
However, since 1987, if the claimant can show that it sustained “some significant 
damage … in England”,14 the English court can, ceteris paribus, decide to summon the 
foreign-based defendant. At the time, this legal development was widely regarded, within 
academic circles,15 as having been introduced in order to align this aspect of English law with 
the rules of jurisdiction in matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict, that are presently 
outlined under Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ia Regulation. Article 7(2) provides that, in the 
context of cross-border tortious disputes, “a person domiciled in a Member State may be sued 
in another Member State … in the courts for the place where the harmful event occurred”. In 
this context, the place where the harmful event occurred includes “both the place where the 
damage occurred and the place of the event giving rise to it”.16 
In identifying “the place where the damage occurred”, the CJEU has made it plain 
that regard must be had to the location where the immediate victim suffered damage directly 
ensuing from the harmful act.17 Illustrative, in this context, is the CJEU’s ruling in Dumez 
France v Hessische Landesbank.18 In this case, the plaintiff, a French company, sustained 
losses in France after the insolvency, in Germany, of its German subsidiary. It argued that the 
insolvency in question, and the resulting losses, had been caused by the German defendant’s 
tortious conduct. Subsequently, the plaintiff commenced tort proceedings in France against 
the defendant. Unsure as to whether it had jurisdiction to entertain the case under (what is 
now) Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ia Regulation,19 the French court sought a preliminary 
ruling from the CJEU. More specifically, the French court asked whether “the term ‘place 
where the damage occurred’ … [could] be understood to refer to the place where the indirect 
victims of the harm discover the harmful consequences to their own property”.20 In response, 
the CJEU stated that, for the purpose of Article 7(2), the location where the damage occurred 
                                                          
13 See, e.g., du Parcq L.J. in George Monro Ltd v American Cyanamid & Chemical Corporation [1944] K.B. 
432 at 441. 
14 Slade L.J. in Metall und Rohstoff v Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette [1990] 1 Q.B. 391 at 437, Stocker and 
Bingham L.JJ. concurring. 
15 L. Collins, et al, Dicey and Morris on The Conflict of Laws, 11th edn., (London: Stevens & Sons Ltd, 1987), 
Rule 28(6), at p. 328 and P.M. North and J.J. Fawcett, Cheshire & North’s Private International Law, 11th edn., 
(London: Butterworths, 1987), at p. 202. 
16 Handelswekerij GJ Bier BV v Mines de Potasse d’Alsace SA [1976] (Case 21/76) E.C.R. 1735 at [24]. 
17 For a detailed discussion of the CJEU’s case law in this area see e.g. A. Briggs, Civil Jurisdiction and 
Judgments, 6th edn., (Abingdon: Informa Law from Routledge, 2015), at paras. 2.201-2.204; A. Briggs, Private 
International Law in English Courts, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), at paras. 4.262-4.268; and Lord 
Collins of Mapesbury, et al, Dicey, Morris & Collins on the Conflict of Laws, 15th edn., (London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2012), Rule 35(3), at paras. 11R.284-11.292. 
18 [1990] (Case 228/88) E.C.R. I-49. 
19 At the time, Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention. 
20 [1990] (Case 228/88) E.C.R. I-49 at [15] (emphasis added). 
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refers only to “the place where the causal event, giving rise to [tortious] liability, directly 
produced the harmful effects in relation to the person who is the immediate victim”.21 
A very similar reasoning formed the basis of the CJEU’s ruling in Marinari v Lloyd’s 
Bank Plc.22 Unlike Dumez France, Marinari concerned the direct victim of an alleged tort. In 
this case, the plaintiff, an Italian domiciliary, brought tort proceedings against the English 
defendant in Italy. The plaintiff submitted that he had suffered financial loss in Italy which, 
he alleged, had been caused by the defendant’s tortious actions. The CJEU was asked to 
decide on whether the Italian court could entertain the case under (what is now) Article 7(2) 
of the Brussels Ia Regulation. In answer to this question, the CJEU, yet again, emphasised 
that, when interpreting Article 7(2), the main point was to identify the place where the 
damage was directly inflicted (rather than the place where it was subsequently felt). Hence, it 
stated that the place where the damage occurred did not include a place where “the victim 
claims to have suffered financial damage consequential on initial damage arising and suffered 
by him in another … state”.23 
As indicated earlier, it was generally accepted that the introduction of the 
jurisdictional gateway under (what is now) C.P.R. P.D. 6B para. 3.1(9)(a) aligned this area of 
English law with Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ia Regulation. Consequently, the English court 
traditionally interpreted gateway 9(a) in a consistent manner with the CJEU’s jurisprudence 
on the construction of Article 7(2). This state of affairs is helpfully illustrated in the Court of 
Appeal’s decision in ABCI v BFT.24 
In this case, the claimants, having entered into a share-purchase agreement with the 
defendants, accused them of misrepresentation and conspiracy to defraud. The claimants 
argued that they made the decision to enter into the ill-fated venture in England. Moreover, 
they contended that, England was where the relevant payment arrangements for the purchase 
of the shares had been made. The defendants resisted the English court’s jurisdiction on the 
basis that the claimant’s case did not fall within the scope of C.P.R. P.D. 6B para. 3.1(9). 
Mance L.J. (as he then was) noted that the jurisdictional gateway had been “introduced in 
1987 in order to ensure that English law was consistent” with (what is now) Article 7(2) of 
the Brussels Ia Regulation.25 Citing the CJEU’s ruling in Dumez France, he held that, “in our 
judgment, [what is now gateway 9(a)] is looking to the direct damage sounding in monetary 
terms which the wrongful act produced upon the claimant”.26 On the facts, therefore, Mance 
L.J. ruled that damage had been sustained in Switzerland (rather than in England), as the 
relevant payment was made from the claimants’ account in Switzerland. 
The ABCI ruling is only one example of the English court expressly relying on the 
CJEU’s construction of (what is now) Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ia Regulation in 
                                                          
21 [1990] (Case 228/88) E.C.R. I-49 at [20] (emphasis added). 
22 [1995] (Case C-364/93) E.C.R. I-2719. 
23 [1995] (Case C-364/93) E.C.R. I-2719 at [15] (emphasis added). See similarly Réunion Européenne SA v 
Spliethoff’s Bevrachtingskantoor BV [1998] (C-51/97) E.C.R. I-6511; Kronhofer v Maier [2004] (Case C-
168/02) E.C.R. I-6009; [2005] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 284; and Zuid-Chemie BV v Philippo’s Mineralenfabriek NV/SA 
[2009] (Case C-189/8) E.C.R. I-6917. See, recently, Case (C-350/14) Florin Lazar v Allianz SpA 
EU:C:2015:802; [2016] I.L.Pr. 5. In this case, the CJEU ruled that Article 4(1) of Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 
on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (‘Rome II Regulation’) should be interpreted in the same 
way as Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ia Regulation. Thus, the applicable law to a tortious dispute under Article 
4(1) of Rome II Regulation is the law of the place in which damage directly arising from the tortious act was 
inflicted on the immediate victim. 
24 [2003] EWCA Civ 205; [2003] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 146. 
25 [2003] EWCA Civ 205; [2003] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 146 at 161. 
26 [2003] EWCA Civ 205; [2003] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 146 at 161 (emphasis added), Tuckey L.J. and Black J. 
concurring. 
5 
 
interpreting gateway 9(a).27 Indeed, for nearly two decades after the introduction of this 
C.P.R. gateway, this state of affairs was widely reflected in the academic commentary.28 
Nevertheless, there were also those who held a different view. Most notable among these 
commentators were the editors of Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments. Writing in its third 
edition, published in 2002, they opined that the damage, for the purpose of (what is now) 
gateway 9(a), should have a broader scope than that under the jurisdictional rule (currently 
outlined) within Article 7(2). In particular, they argued that, notwithstanding the English 
law’s traditional reading of gateway 9(a), there was “no compelling reason to apply” the 
CJEU’s case law on the interpretation of Article 7(2) “outside the field of application of the 
[Brussels Regime]”.29 They, therefore, considered that the gateway “may in principle 
[include] cases where the damage is felt in England indirectly or consequentially, as a result 
of other acts or damage sustained elsewhere”.30 In this respect, the editors of Civil 
Jurisdiction and Judgments, in effect, advocated an approach to the construction of C.P.R. 
P.D. 6B para. 3.1(9)(a) which had been commonly applied in relation to the interpretation of 
a similar tort gateway in Canada31 and Australia.32 
III. (An Abortive) Departure from the Traditional Approach? 
Given that the case law and the majority of the academic commentators clearly stated that 
there should be an alignment in the interpretation of gateway 9(a) and the equivalent 
provision (presently stated) under Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ia Regulation, it was difficult 
to conceive that the English court would embrace the construction proposed by the editors of 
Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments. However, over the past decade or so, this (broader) stance 
on the interpretation of gateway 9(a) has been endorsed (and applied) in a number of first-
instance authorities. These cases,33 which have become numerous over a relatively short 
period of time, show that the meaning accorded to the gateway has been expanded as to 
include indirect (as well as direct) damages sustained by the victim (or their family members) 
in England. 
(a) The decision in Booth v Phillips 
In this context, the first case to consider is Booth v Phillips.34 In this case, an English 
claimant commenced proceedings against a number of foreign-based defendants. The claim 
                                                          
27 See also, traditionally, Bastone & Firminger Ltd v Nasima Enterprises (Nigeria) Ltd [1996] C.L.C. 1902; 
Beecham Group plc v Norton Healthcare Ltd [1997] F.S.R. 81; and, Newsat Holdings Ltd v Zani [2006] EWHC 
342 (Comm); [2006] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 707. 
28 E.g. P.M. North and J.J. Fawcett, Cheshire and North’s Private International Law, 12th edn., (London: 
Butterworths, 1992), at p. 199; P.M. North and J.J. Fawcett, Cheshire and North’s Private International Law, 
13th edn., (London: Butterworths, 1999), at pp. 306-307; A. Briggs and P. Rees, Civil Jurisdiction and 
Judgments, 3rd edn., (London: LLP, 2002), at para. 4.40; J. Hill, International Commercial Disputes in English 
Courts, 3rd edn., (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005), at paras 7.3.29-7.3.30; and, C.M.V. Clarkson and J. Hill, The 
Conflict of Laws, 3rd edn., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), at p. 94. 
29 A. Briggs and P. Rees, Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments, 3rd edn., (London: LLP, 2002),  at para. 4.40. 
30 A. Briggs and P. Rees, Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments, 3rd edn., (London: LLP, 2002), at para. 4.40 
(emphasis added, citations omitted). 
31 E.g. Skyrotors Ltd v Carriere Technical Industries Ltd (1979) 102 D.L.R. (3d) 323 and Vile v Von Wendt 
(1979) 103 D.L.R. (3d) 356. 
32 E.g. Flaherty v Girgis [1985] 4 N.S.W.L.R. 248. 
33 E.g., Booth v Phillips [2004] EWHC 1437 (Comm); [2004] 1 W.L.R. 3292; Cooley v Ramsey [2008] EWHC 
129 (QB); [2008] I.L.Pr. 27; Wink v Croatia Osiguranje DD [2013] EWHC 1118 (QB); Stylianou v Toyoshima 
[2013] EWHC 2188 (QB); and Pike v Indian Hotels Co Ltd [2013] EWHC 4096 (QB). 
34 [2004] EWHC 1437 (Comm); [2004] 1 W.L.R. 3292. 
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had arisen following the death of the claimant’s husband while working on board the 
defendants’ vessel. The claimant sought, inter alia, to obtain the English court’s permission 
for the service of proceedings outside of jurisdiction, pursuant to gateway 9(a). In particular, 
she argued that she had sustained damage within the jurisdiction because it was in England 
where her loss of dependency on her husband and the funeral expenses had been incurred. 
The defendants challenged that submission, in turn, arguing that the damage arising from the 
alleged wrongdoing had been sustained in Egypt, where the deceased suffered the fatal 
injury. 
Nigel Teare Q.C. (as he then was) began by reiterating the familiar starting 
proposition – first stated by Slade L.J. in the Metall und Rohstoff case – that, for the purpose 
of gateway 9(a), “it was enough that ‘some significant damage’ had been sustained in 
England”.35 Rather surprisingly, he was not referred to and (perhaps, consequently) did not 
discuss any of the authorities which highlighted the English court’s traditional interpretation 
of C.P.R. P.D. 6B para. 3.1(9)(a). Instead, Nigel Teare Q.C. relied on a number of cases from 
Australia and Canada,36 which had assumed a much wider scope for the notion of damage 
under the respective tort gateways in those jurisdictions than had traditionally been conceived 
of in England. He stated that these decisions were compatible with his reading of the word 
“damage” as outlined within subparagraph 9(a). Furthermore, Nigel Teare Q.C. considered 
that it was not unwarranted to interpret damage widely because, ultimately, the court’s 
discretion whether to serve a claim form on a foreign-based defendant hinged on England 
being forum conveniens.37 Accordingly, he concluded that, for the purpose of C.P.R. P.D. 6B 
para. 3.1(9)(a), England was the place where the losses suffered by the claimant had been 
sustained.38 
(b) The immediate fallout from the decision in Booth 
In its aftermath, it was not immediately apparent whether the decision in Booth had, indeed, 
brought about a sea change in the English court’s approach to the interpretation of damage 
under gateway 9(a). In fact, for some time after the decision, Booth received very little 
attention within the case law. For example, no mention of the case was made in Newsat 
Holdings Ltd v Zani,39 a first-instance case litigated in 2006. The court in this case had been 
primarily concerned with the interpretation of (what is now) gateway 9(b). Nevertheless, the 
question of whether damage had been sustained in England was argued as a secondary point. 
In response to it, and citing the decision in ABCI, David Steel J. stressed that, for the damage 
to fall within the scope of gateway 9(a), it had to be “direct damage, sounding in monetary 
terms”.40 
Similarly, the reaction, within the academic commentary, to the decision in Booth 
further reinforced the impression that it was not to be treated as an authority of such 
significance to have instigated a change of approach in this aspect of English law. In fact, the 
majority of the legal commentators appeared to regard it as an anomalous ruling. For 
instance, in the third edition of International Commercial Disputes in English Courts, 
Professor Hill considered the decision as “surprising”.41 In its 14th edition, published in 2006, 
                                                          
35 [2004] EWHC 1437 (Comm); [2004] 1 W.L.R. 3292 at [38]. 
36 [2004] EWHC 1437 (Comm); [2004] 1 W.L.R. 3292 at [40]-[42]. 
37 [2004] EWHC 1437 (Comm); [2004] 1 W.L.R. 3292 at [36]. 
38 [2004] EWHC 1437 (Comm); [2004] 1 W.L.R. 3292 at [44]. 
39 [2006] EWHC 342 (Comm); [2006] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 707. 
40 [2006] EWHC 342 (Comm); [2006] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 707 at [49] (emphasis added). 
41 J. Hill, International Commercial Disputes in English Courts, 3rd edn., (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005), at 
para. 9.2.12. 
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the editors of Dicey, Morris and Collins only referred to the decision in passing, merely 
stating that it had followed the Canadian and Australian approach to the conception of 
damage sustained within the jurisdiction.42 Even the editors of the fourth edition of Civil 
Jurisdiction and Judgments – who had, in the earlier edition, appeared to favour the approach 
ultimately adopted in Booth – made a fleeting (and incidental) reference to the case in a 
footnote, while still acknowledging the English court’s traditional approach to the 
interpretation of (what is now) C.P.R. P.D. 6B para. 3.1(9)(a), as exemplified in the ABCI 
case.43 
(c) Cooley v Ramsey: Booth followed 
In these circumstances, it was reasonable to have expected that the decision in Booth was 
destined to be a short-lived aberration, rather than the start of a transformation in the English 
court’s interpretation of the notion of damage under subparagraph 9(a). However, the English 
court’s reliance on Booth, when asked to rule on the interpretation of the gateway in Cooley v 
Ramsey,44 suggested otherwise. 
The dispute in Cooley had arisen from a road-traffic accident in New South Wales. 
The claimant, a British citizen, had suffered serious injuries in that accident, rendering him 
severely disabled. Following a period of rehabilitation in Australia, the claimant returned to 
England, where he was cared for by his parents. Subsequently, he started proceedings in 
negligence against the Australian-based defendant. One of the main issues for consideration 
was whether, for the purpose of C.P.R. P.D. 6B para. 3.1(9)(a), the claimant had sustained 
damage in England. The claimant relied on the decision in Booth, arguing that the economic 
loss which he had suffered in England – as a consequence of the tort committed in Australia – 
fell within the scope of gateway 9(a). In response, the defendant challenged the claimant’s 
reliance on the decision in Booth. In particular, the defendant questioned the grounds on 
which the decision in Booth had been made, especially the fact that the decision was 
inconsistent with the CJEU’s interpretation of (what is now) Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ia 
Regulation. 
After a detailed discussion of the case,45 Tugendhat J. followed Nigel Teare Q.C.’s 
judgment in Booth. In reaching this conclusion, he drew support from the observation, in the 
fourth edition of Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments,46 that “there is no compelling reason” for 
the construction of C.P.R. P.D. 6B para. 3.1(9)(a) to follow that of the equivalent provision 
within the Brussels Regime.47 In this respect, Tugendhat J. acknowledged that it may well 
have been that what is now set out under gateway 9(a) had been re-branded in 1987 in order 
to align the English law, in this area, with the position under the Brussels Regime. 
Nevertheless, he noted that, these systems of jurisdiction rules had not been “fully 
assimilate[d]” by the UK Parliament; “under the [Brussels Regime] the court retains no 
discretion, whereas [outside the scope of the Brussels Regime] there is the discretion to be 
                                                          
42 L. Collins, et al (eds.), Dicey, Morris and Collins on The Conflict of Laws, 14th edn., (London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2006), at para. 11.221. 
43 A. Briggs and P. Rees, Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments, 4th edn., (London: LLP, 2005), at para. 4.43. 
44 [2008] EWHC 129 (QB); [2008] I.L.Pr. 27. 
45 [2008] EWHC 129 (QB); [2008] I.L.Pr. 27 at [19]-[34]. 
46 A. Briggs and P. Rees, Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments, 4th edn., (London: LLP, 2005), at para. 4.43. 
47 [2008] EWHC 129 (QB); [2008] I.L.Pr. 27 at [36]. 
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found under [gateway 9(a)]”.48 Accordingly, Tugendhat J. held that, on the facts, England 
was where the damage had been inflicted on the claimant.49 
(d) Reaction to the decision in Cooley 
Tugendhat J.’s judgment in Cooley strengthened the impression – which had been formed, at 
first, following the decision in Booth – that the English court was beginning to favour a much 
wider conception of damage, under C.P.R. P.D. 6B para. 3.1(9)(a), than it had traditionally. 
Indeed, this sense of transition was further reinforced not long after the decision in Cooley. In 
a number of first-instance cases, litigated in quick succession, the English court endorsed the 
construction outlined in Booth and Cooley in defining the scope of gateway 9(a): Harty v 
Sabre International Security Ltd,50 Wink v Croatia Osiguranje DD,51 Stylianou v 
Toyoshima52 and Pike v Indian Hotels Co Ltd.53 
These cases arose from different factual scenarios. However, in essence, they 
concerned service-out applications by British claimants, who had suffered life-changing 
injuries, while abroad, as a result of foreign-based defendants’ wrongdoing. In each case, the 
defendants challenged the claimants’ reliance on gateway 9(a), as the jurisdictional ground 
for effecting the service outside the jurisdiction. In particular, they invited the English court 
to revisit its construction of that provision, as outlined in Booth and Cooley, and to interpret 
it, instead, in line with its counterpart measure under the Brussels Regime. In other words, 
they sought to persuade the court to return to its traditional construction of damage under 
C.P.R. P.D. 6B para. 3.1(9)(a). In all of these cases, however, the English court declined this 
invitation. Instead, it favoured the interpretation adopted in Booth and Cooley. Accordingly, 
the court stated that the claimants’ case fell within the scope of gateway 9(a), notwithstanding 
that the damage in England had been sustained subsequent to the initial injury, which had 
been inflicted outside of England. In short, in a limited timeframe, it became increasingly 
commonplace for the English court to afford a much wider reading to the notion of damage 
for the purpose subparagraph 9(a).54 
However, just as this new interpretive stance was becoming more prominent, Erste 
Group Bank AG (London) v JSC (VMZ Red October) went before the Court of Appeal.55 The 
dispute in this case had arisen from a loan-transaction agreement. Under the agreement, the 
claimant bank had undertaken to lend money to the first defendant (‘D1’), a Russian entity. 
The second defendant (‘D2’), another Russian entity, acted as the guarantor. D1 and D2 
defaulted on one of the repayment instalments. The claimant alleged that D1’s and D2’s 
default had been deliberate and induced by an unlawful-means conspiracy between D1 and 
D2, and the other defendants, to render D1 and D2 insolvent. One of the heads of action, 
pursued by the claimant, was in tort. In this respect, the claimant applied for an order to serve 
tort proceedings against the Russia-based defendants on the grounds that England, where the 
claimant had its designated Facility Office, was the place in which it had, as a result of the 
alleged conspiracy and the defendants’ default, sustained damage, for the purpose of gateway 
9(a). In response, the defendants argued, inter alia, that the gateway should be interpreted 
consistently with the equivalent provision under the Brussels Regime. Thus, they claim that 
                                                          
48 [2008] EWHC 129 (QB); [2008] I.L.Pr. 27 at [35]. 
49 [2008] EWHC 129 (QB); [2008] I.L.Pr. 27 at [53]. 
50 [2011] EWHC 852 (QB). 
51 [2013] EWHC 1118 (QB). 
52 [2013] EWHC 2188 (QB). 
53 [2013] EWHC 4096 (QB). 
54 See also Saldanha v Fulton Navigation Inc [2011] EWHC 1118 (Admlty); [2011] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 206. 
55 [2015] EWCA Civ 379. 
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the English court lacked jurisdiction under gateway 9(a) as the damage directly arising from 
the defendants’ actions had not been felt in England. At first instance, Flaux J. noted that, in 
Booth and Cooley, the English court had discussed and dismissed the defendant’s contention 
concerning the need for consistency in the interpretation of C.P.R. P.D. 6B para. 3.1(9)(a), on 
the one hand, and (what is now) Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ia Regulation, on the other.56 
After a close assessment of the decisions in Booth, Cooley and Wink, Flaux J. concluded that 
the defendants’ argument was “hopeless”.57 He, therefore, held that the claimant had 
established that, for the purpose of subparagraph 9(a), damage had been sustained in England. 
The Court of Appeal, however, unanimously reversed Flaux J.’s ruling. It stated that 
the conceptionof the notion of damage under gateway 9(a), in decisions such as Booth and 
Cooley, had rendered the measure “extraordinarily wide”.58 The court stated that it held 
“serious reservations as to whether [they] were right”.59 Nevertheless, those reservations did 
not appear to be sufficiently serious for the Court of Appeal to overrule the decisions in 
Booth, Cooley or any of the other first-instance rulings which had favoured a broader 
interpretation of the notion of damage. The Court of Appeal relied on an approach to the 
construction of C.P.R. P.D. 6B para. 3.1(9)(a) which had been similar to that which had been 
traditionally applied in England. Accordingly, it ruled that, for the purpose of the provision, 
damage had occurred in New York, where the repayment instalment was due; England was 
merely where the consequential damage had occurred.60 
Shortly after its ruling in Erste, in Brownlie v Four Seasons Holdings Inc,61 the Court 
of Appeal once more reiterated its support for a narrower interpretation of damage under 
gateway 9(a). In Brownlie, the claim had arisen following a road-traffic accident in Egypt. As 
a result of the accident, tragically, the claimant’s husband was killed and she had sustained 
injuries. After returning to England, the claimant commenced service-out proceedings in tort 
(and contract) against the Canadian defendants, seeking damages for personal injury, loss of 
dependency and losses in her capacity as her late husband’s executrix. In the context of the 
tortious claim, which is relevant to the present discussion, the claimant relied on cases like 
Booth and Cooley in submitting that the consequential damage that she had sustained in 
England was sufficient to bring her case within the scope of gateway 9(a). In response, the 
defendants pointed to the Court of Appeal’s ruling in Erste and also earlier decisions in 
which the English court had construed damage under C.P.R. P.D. 6B para. 3.1(9)(a) in line 
with the interpretation of Article 7(2) of Brussels Ia Regulation. Accordingly, the defendants 
argued that, as Egypt (rather than England) was where the direct damage arising from the 
alleged tort had been inflicted, the claimant’s case fell outside the scope of gateway 9(a). In a 
unanimous decision, which partially overturned Tugendhat J.’s judgment at first instance,62 
the Court of Appeal upheld the defendants’ submission. Accordingly, the court ruled that 
only the loss-of-dependency claim fell within the confines of gateway 9(a).63 
                                                          
56 [2013] EWHC 2926 (Comm) at [144]. 
57 [2013] EWHC 2926 (Comm) at [147]. 
58 [2015] EWCA Civ 379 at [104]. 
59 [2015] EWCA Civ 379 at [105]. 
60 [2015] EWCA Civ 379 at [107]. 
61 [2015] EWCA Civ 665; [2015] C.P. Rep. 40. Noted, I. Bergson, “Consequential loss and the tort gateway” 
(2016) 132 L.Q.R. 42. 
62 [2014] EWHC 273 (QB). 
63 [2015] EWCA Civ 665; [2015] C.P. Rep. 40 at [85]-[86]. In the course of its reasoning, the Court of Appeal 
stated that gateway 9(a) should be interpreted in line with Article 4(1) of the Rome II Regulation. For the 
purpose of Article 4(1), damage is interpreted in precisely the same way as it is under Article 7(2) of the 
Brussels Ia Regulation: see especially Case (C-350/14) Florin Lazar v Allianz SpA EU:C:2015:802; [2016] 
I.L.Pr. 5. 
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(e) Interpreting gateway 9(a): a confusing picture 
The forgoing discussion, in this part, has highlighted the emergence of a clear divergence, 
over the past decade or so, in the English court’s approach to the conception of damage, 
within the context of C.P.R. P.D. 6B para. 3.1(9)(a). In a number of cases, decided in quick 
succession and in a relatively short period of time, the English court has widened its 
interpretation of this provision and held that it includes any damage (whether direct of 
otherwise) sustained by the immediate victim (or their family members) within England. This 
development is out of step with almost two decades of legal precedent and scholarship. It, 
therefore, has brought inconsistency and confusion to this area of law. This incoherence is 
also reflected in the discussions within the academic commentary on the meaning of C.P.R. 
P.D. 6B para. 3.1(9)(a). For example, Professors Clarkson and Hill have been categorical in 
their rejection of the new interpretation for the provision. They observe that, in so far as the 
interpretation gateway 9(a) is concerned, Booth and Cooley “can legitimately be regarded as 
having been wrongly decided”.64 In the same vein, though in a much more equivocal manner, 
the editors of Dicey, Morris and Collins appear to hold doubts about the accuracy of the 
position outlined in Booth and Cooley.65 However, and perhaps unsurprisingly, Professor 
Briggs has remained the main advocate for the wider conception of damage under C.P.R. 
P.D. 6B para. 3.1(9)(a). It is recalled that, as one of the editors of the first five editions of 
Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments, Professor Briggs had long advocated for a broader 
interpretation to be afforded to the notion of damage under the provision than that envisaged 
under the traditional approach. In the sixth (and most recent) edition of Civil Jurisdiction and 
Judgments, published in 2015, but before the Court of Appeal’s judgments in Erste and 
Brownlie had been handed down, he cited the decisions in Booth and Cooley, among others, 
stating that “there is no need for ‘alignment’” between the interpretation of gateway 9(a) and 
its equivalent provision within the Brussels Regime.66 
At first blush, it might be deemed that the clear difference of opinion, within case law 
and academic commentary, does not pose a pressing problem. After all, the new approach to 
the interpretation of gateway 9(a) is derived from first-instance authorities, which may be 
considered to be of little doctrinal significance. Additionally (and, perhaps, more 
importantly), in Erste and Brownlie, the Court of Appeal appears to have cast doubt on the 
reliability of these decisions, in particular, and their reading of damage under C.P.R. P.D. 6B 
para. 3.1(9)(a), in general. 
Be that as it may, it is argued that, it would be a mistake not to address the evident 
confusion within the English case law surrounding the construction of gateway 9(a). It is true 
that, in Erste and Brownlie, the Court of Appeal was critical of the broader conception of 
damage, which had been endorsed in first-instance authorities such as Booth and Cooley. 
However, on both occasions, the Court of Appeal fell short of definitively discarding it.67 Put 
                                                          
64 C.M.V. Clarkson and J. Hill, The Conflict of Laws, 4th edn., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), at p. 
111. See also J. Hill and A. Chong, International Commercial Disputes: Commercial Conflict of Laws in 
English Courts, 4th edn., (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010), at para. 7.3.31. 
65 Lord Collins of Mapesbury, et al, Dicey, Morris & Collins on the Conflict of Laws, 15th edn., (London: Sweet 
& Maxwell, 2012), Rule 34, at para. 11.216 (fn. 600). See also J.J. Fawcett and J.M. Carruthers, Cheshire, 
North & Fawcett’s Private International Law, 14th edn., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), at p. 386. 
66 A. Briggs, Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments, 6th edn., (Abingdon: Informa Law from Routledge 2015), at 
para. 4.73. 
67 In Erste, the Court of Appeal appeared to distinguish those cases from the matter before it, which had 
concerned damage as a result of non-payment of a sum: [2015] EWCA Civ 379 at [105]. In the same vein, and 
notwithstanding its statements to the contrary, the court’s decision in Brownlie to entertain the loss-of-
dependency claim allowed for an indirect loss to form the basis for service out under gateway 9(a): [2015] 
EWCA Civ 665; [2015] C.P. Rep. 40 at [86]. 
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simply, the door has been left ajar for the more-expansive interpretation of gateway 9(a) to be 
relied on in future cases. In these circumstances, and given that this approach has Professor 
Briggs’s categorical endorsement, there is every prospect for it to form the basis for the 
English court’s decision making in tort service-out cases. 
In short, it is argued that, there is still scope not only for the confusion surrounding 
the precise scope of subparagraph 9(a) to continue, but also, to become potentially even more 
stark. Hence, the next part of the discussion seeks to take steps towards clarifying the 
uncertainty in this area. Accordingly, its chief intention is to put forward a reasoned case in 
favour of upholding the most plausible approach, from those highlighted in the existing cases, 
to the construction of the notion of damage sustained within the jurisdiction under gateway 
9(a). 
IV. How Should C.P.R. P.D. 6B para. 3.1(9)(a) Be Interpreted? 
As the point of departure, for the discussion in this section, it is useful to start by revisiting 
the main basis on which the recently-developed conception of C.P.R. P.D. 6B para. 3.1(9)(a) 
has been founded. It is recalled that, traditionally, the English court’s reading of the provision 
had been in line with the scope of the jurisdiction rule (now set out) under Article 7(2) of the 
Brussels Ia Regulation. In other words, similar to that rule of jurisdiction, only damage that 
was directly felt by the immediate victim of the alleged tortious conduct fell within the 
confines of gateway 9(a). 
The main driving force behind the emergence of a wider reading of gateway 9(a) is 
the view that, in a service-out case, the English court’s assumption of jurisdiction is 
discretionary and, ultimately, dependent on whether it is forum conveniens. This position 
differs from that under Article 7(2). Under Article 7(2), the court before which the dispute 
has been brought has no discretion whether to entertain the case; if the matter falls within the 
scope of Article 7(2), it must hear it. Therefore, the fact that a claimant, in a service-out case, 
has to persuade the court that it is the proper forum for entertaining the dispute has been 
considered, by itself, to be sufficient to justify affording a broader meaning to the notion of 
damage under gateway 9(a) than that which has been ascribed to Article 7(2) of the Brussels 
Ia Regulation. In this respect, Professor Briggs’s observation in the following passage, in the 
latest edition of Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments, distils clearly the reasoning central to the 
development of a divergent interpretation for gateway 9(a): 
“the function of Article 7(2) as an exception to the jurisdiction of Article 4, and as a rule of 
special jurisdiction not further controlled in its application by a principle of forum 
conveniens, is quite separate and distinct, and has a function quite different, from sub-
Paragraph 9(a). For where jurisdiction is to be asserted under [C.P.R. P.D. 6B para. 
3.1(9)(a)], the claimant must also, separately, clearly and distinctly, satisfy the requirement 
of forum conveniens before the court will authorise service to be made out of the 
jurisdiction. There is therefore no need for ‘alignment’ with a jurisdictional rule which 
serves a quite different function”.68 
Nonetheless, it is argued that, for four main reasons, this recently-developed interpretation for 
the gateway is open to question and, in fact, should be abandoned. Instead, the English court 
should definitively uphold its traditional construction, thereby, confining its reading of 
subparagraph 9(a) to a framework which is consistent with the interpretation of Article 7(2) 
of the Brussels Ia Regulation. 
                                                          
68 A. Briggs, Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments, 6th edn. (Abingdon: Informa Law from Routledge 2015), at para. 
4.73 (citations omitted). 
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The first reason for this contention is that the consideration at the heart of the English 
court’s more-recent pronouncements69 is a non sequitur: in logical terms, it would only work 
if it is predicated on the assumption that the forum conveniens requirement has only just been 
introduced into English law. Such an assumption would be misplaced, however. It is well 
known that, in the context of service-out cases, the English court had applied the forum 
conveniens principle long before the formal recognition of its sister doctrine (of forum non 
conveniens), in Spiliada Maritime Corporation v Cansulex Ltd,70 for cases concerning stays 
of as-of-right proceedings. As long ago as 1925, in Rosler v Hilbery, Pollock M.R. observed 
that 
“The [service-out] jurisdiction is discretionary, and there is no question that in deciding 
whether or not it will exercise its discretion the Court pays attention to a great number of 
matters, in particular it would pay attention to what is the forum conveniens”.71 
Those whom, in 1987, introduced the jurisdictional gateway (which is now) outlined under 
subparagraph 9(a), must have been surely aware of the existence of the forum conveniens 
condition. Nevertheless, they adopted a wording for the new gateway which mirrored the 
interpretation afforded to the special jurisdiction rule, (currently spelt out) under Article 7(2) 
of the Brussels Ia Regulation, as elaborated on in the Bier case. Furthermore, for nearly two 
decades, and despite the existence of the forum conveniens requirement, the English court 
had interpreted the gateway in line with the construction of Article 7(2). At no stage, in that 
period and until the judgment in Booth, was there any intimation in the case law, concerning 
the interpretation of gateway 9(a), that the forum conveniens criterion had any influence on 
the construction of that provision. Thus, it is difficult to see what has suddenly changed to 
render persuasive the viewpoint, central to the recent developments in the case law, that the 
forum conveniens condition justifies a wider conception of gateway 9(a). 
The second (and arguably more significant) consideration in favour of an outright 
abandonment of the broader interpretation of damage under C.P.R. P.D. 6B para. 3.1(9)(a) is 
that it inevitably leads to a disproportionate expansion of this aspect of the English court’s 
service-out jurisdiction.72 The basis for this contention is that, contrary to the reasoning 
underpinning the emergence and development of the new constructive model, the forum 
conveniens test is not sufficiently well-placed to mitigate the expansionary effect of departing 
from the English court’s traditional reading of gateway 9(a). In this regard, the English 
court’s decisions in cases like Cooley, Wink, Stylianou and Pike are especially illustrative. As 
discussed earlier, in all these cases, the claimants had suffered serious injuries, attributable to 
foreign-based defendants, while outside England. They sought redress for damage which had 
directly occasioned elsewhere (and only subsequently felt in England).73 The life-changing 
nature of the injuries, among other factors, had meant that the claimants would have faced 
serious difficulties in bringing their claims in the forum where the tortious act had happened 
(and the direct damage arising from it had been sustained). Therefore, by their very nature, 
these were not the type of cases in which, following the forum conveniens analysis, the 
English court was likely to arrive at any conclusion other than to sustain its proceedings. 
                                                          
69 E.g. Nigel Teare Q.C. in Booth [2004] EWHC 1437 (Comm); [2004] 1 W.L.R. 3292 at [36]; Haddon-Cave J. 
in Wink [2013] EWHC 1118 (QB) at [41]; Sir Robert Nelson in Stylianou [2013] EWHC 2188 (QB) at [43]-
[46]; and, Stewart J. in Pike [2013] EWHC 4096 (QB) at [18]. 
70 [1987] A.C. 460. 
71 [1925] Ch. 250 at 259. 
72 See also the Court of Appeal’s judgment in the Erste Group Bank case [2015] EWCA Civ 379 at [104]. 
73 In Booth, where the claimant’s husband had died in the accident, the damage in question, for the purpose of 
C.P.R. P.D. 6B para 3.1(9)(a), had been sustained by a party other than the immediate victim of the tort. 
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Indeed, in all of these cases, the English court went on to conclude that it was the proper 
place in which the claim could be entertained.74 In light of the outcome of the forum 
conveniens analysis in these cases, it is reasonable to speculate that, in the context of cases 
similar to these, the loosening of the connection requirement – by widening the interpretation 
of the relevant gateway – would almost always lead to the English court assuming 
jurisdiction over the foreign-based defendant. However, had the English court relied on its 
traditional reading of gateway 9(a), it would not have had jurisdiction over them. 
Consequently, it is argued that the existence of the forum conveniens threshold will not be a 
robust enough barrier to stem the tide of cross-border tort cases in which the English court 
could assert jurisdiction by means of ex juris service of proceedings. 
By the same token, a third reason for departing from a wider conception of C.P.R. 
P.D. 6B para. 3.1(9)(a), and reverting to the (narrower) traditional interpretation of the 
provision, can be advanced. In this respect, it is argued that, both in principle and policy 
terms, it would be undesirable to expand the scope of jurisdictional gateways within the 
C.P.R.. In recent years, there have been a number of judicial pronouncements, highlighting a 
degree of relaxation, on the part of the English court, in relation especially to the procedural 
requirements which a claimant must meet in order to obtain the English court’s permission 
for the service of the proceedings outside the jurisdiction. A helpful summary of these 
changes can be found in Professor Briggs’s Private International Law in English Courts. For 
example, Professor Briggs has noted that, based on the U.K. Supreme Court’s ruling in NML 
Capital Ltd v Argentina,75 
“it is no longer the case that a claimant is limited to defending his permission to serve out on 
the Grounds which he originally identified as being available to him when he applied for it, 
or which were in the notice which accompanied service on the defendant: if it should appear 
that another service Ground might have been more plausibly relied on, he will be permitted 
to rely on it, at least if he does not need to amend his claim form to do so”.76 
Additionally, Professor Briggs has pointed to the judgment of the U.K. Supreme Court in 
Abela v Baadarani,77 observing that 
“it is no longer the case, if ever it really was, that a claimant who faces difficulty in tracking 
down a defendant who lurks and hides overseas will find access to justice barred by inability 
to effect service, for the court has power to order that service was properly made if satisfied 
that the claimant did his best and that defendant knew perfectly well of the claim in the 
documents whose service he was doing his best to evade”.78 
In this case, and in the context of a question concerning the service-out process, Lord 
Sumption had remarked that, if the claimant is able to show that England is forum 
conveniens, “it should no longer [then] be necessary to resort to the kind of muscular 
presumptions against service out which are implicit in adjectives like ‘exorbitant’”.79 
                                                          
74 In so far as the decision in Pike was concerned, the court’s ruling on the forum conveniens point had been 
influenced by the claimant’s contention that he would face significant delay if he were to seek redress against 
the defendant in India, where the harmful event had happened. 
75 [2011] UKSC 31; [2011] 2 A.C. 495. 
76 A. Briggs, Private International Law in English Courts, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), at para. 
4.458 (citations omitted). 
77 [2013] UKSC 44; [2013] 1 W.L.R. 2043. Noted, A. Briggs, “Service Out in a Shrinking World” [2013] 
L.M.C.L.Q. 415 and A. Dickinson “Service abroad – an inconvenient obstacle?” (2014) 130 L.Q.R. 197. 
78 A. Briggs, Private International Law in English Courts, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), [4.458] 
(citations omitted). 
79 [2013] UKSC 44; [2013] 1 W.L.R. 2043 at [53]. 
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For the most part, these developments have come about in order to make the process 
of granting a permission to service out of the jurisdiction more pragmatic;80 their basic effect 
has been to make it less onerous, from a procedural viewpoint, for a claimant to commence 
service-out proceedings in England. It does not necessarily follow that this apparent 
procedural relaxation in the English court’s approach to dealing with service-out applications 
also warrants a looser treatment of the jurisdictional gateways within the C.P.R.. Indeed, in 
these circumstances, it is scarcely desirable, it is contended, for the English court to further 
expand its service-out jurisdiction. After all, and notwithstanding observations to the 
contrary,81 the English court’s service-out jurisdiction is widely regarded to be exorbitant.82 
Accordingly, it is argued that the English court should remain restrained in its interpretation 
of the specific gateways, thereby ensuring that it is not tilting the balance, unduly, in the 
claimant’s favour. 
The fourth (and final) argument in favour of reverting to the traditional interpretation 
of gateway 9(a) is that it represents the best way of upholding the central objective for which 
that provision (and others within the C.P.R.) had been originally created. In policy terms, in 
the context of cross-border commercial disputes in England, one of the key considerations is 
to assess whether there is a sufficient link between the defendant and the forum to justify the 
English court’s assertion of jurisdiction. This connection could typically be established based 
on the defendant’s submission to the English proceedings, presence or domicile in England or 
conduct. In the context of a service-out case, the C.P.R. gateways signify points of 
connection between the defendant (or his actions) and England. The case in question must 
fall within at least one of these gateways before the English court can decide whether to 
assume jurisdiction over it. The threshold for the connection between the defendant and 
England must be set at an appropriate level to warrant the assertion of jurisdiction. It is 
argued that this objective is met if the provision is interpreted in a way which would not 
undermine the defendant’s reasonable expectation – namely, that he would only be 
summoned to defend the English proceedings if there was some form of connection between 
his conduct and England. However much one might sympathise with the claimants in cases 
like Booth, Cooley, Wink, Stylianou and Pike, for the purpose of gateway 9(a), the defendants 
(or their actions) in these cases had no connection with England: the claimants’ indirect (and 
consequential) losses in England provided, it is argued, too tenuous a link between the 
tortfeasors and England to justify the English court’s assertion of jurisdiction. In other words, 
there was simply nothing in these cases to amount to a strong-enough link between the 
defendants and England as to justify tilting the jurisdictional balance to England. It is, 
therefore, contended that the objective at the heart of the creation of gateway 9(a) would be 
best served if the court decidedly reverted to its traditional interpretation of that provision and 
read it consistently with the interpretation of (what is now) Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ia 
Regulation. 
V. Conclusion 
The principal intention of this article has been to examine the English court’s approach to the 
interpretation of the notion of “damage”, for the purpose of C.P.R. P.D. 6B para. 3.1(9)(a). 
                                                          
80 Indeed, in the context of the facts in Abela v Baadarani, Professor Briggs has regarded the ruling to be “a 
textbook piece of common law and common sense”:  A. Briggs, “Service Out in a Shrinking World” [2013] 
L.M.C.L.Q. 415 at 415. 
81 L. Collins, “Temporary presence, exorbitant jurisdiction and the US Supreme Court” (1991) 107 L.Q.R. 10 
and L. Collins, “Sovereignty and exorbitant jurisdiction” (2014) 130 L.Q.R. 555. 
82 See e.g. the judgments of Scott L.J., in George Monro Ltd v American Cyanamid & Chemical Corporation 
[1944] K.B. 432 at 437, and Diplock L.J. (as he then was), in Mackender v Feldia AG [1967] 2 Q.B. 590 at 599. 
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This provision was first brought into (what is now) the C.P.R. in 1987. It is one of two 
gateways through which a claimant, in a cross-border tortious claim, could seek to obtain the 
English court’s permission for service of the proceedings outside the jurisdiction. 
The preceding analysis has shown that, even though it has been in existence for the 
best part of three decades, the precise meaning of gateway 9(a) is still somewhat unclear. Part 
II of the discussion highlighted that, traditionally, and for over a decade and a half after its 
introduction, the English court conceived of damage in a consistent manner with the CJEU’s 
jurisprudence on the construction of (what is now) Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ia Regulation. 
Accordingly, only damage directly sustained by the immediate victim of the alleged tortious 
conduct fell within the scope of gateway 9(a). Part III, then, went on to show that, over the 
past decade or so, there has been an apparent departure on the part of the English court from 
that traditionally-held stance. In this respect, the analysis demonstrated the emergence of a 
preference, on the part of the English court, for a wider interpretation of C.P.R. P.D. 6B para. 
3.1(9)(a) which encompasses indirect (as well as direct) damage sustained by the victim (or 
their family members) in England. Although, in view of the Court of Appeal’s recent 
decisions in Erste and Brownlie, this change of tack may now be regarded as having been 
aborted, it was argued that the door has not been firmly shut on the more-expansive 
conception of damage. There is still much scope for the approach to be applied again and, 
thereby, for the confusion surrounding the precise meaning of gateway 9(a) to endure. 
In these circumstances, Part IV of the discussion sought to advance a reasoned case in 
favour of upholding the most plausible approach, from those currently outlined in the case 
law, to the construction of the notion of damage under gateway 9(a). Four key arguments 
were advanced in support of the view that the English court should unequivocally abandon 
the broader construction of C.P.R. P.D. 6B para. 3.1(9)(a) and, instead, read the provision in 
line with the interpretation of Article 7(2) of the Brussels Ia Regulation. It is argued that such 
a step would bring much certainty and clarity to this aspect of the English conflict-of-laws 
rules. 
 
 
